I. Introduction
This paper analyzes the dynamics of an incentive problem between borrowers and lenders. The main result is that incentive problems can be most severe for borrowers with very short track records and become less severe for borrowers who manage to acquire a "good reputation." This explicit prediction about the evolution of incentives over time extends the existing work on reputation that focuses on the beneficial effect of a long horizon in the future. Milgrom and Roberts (1982) in viewing a reputation as arising from learning over time from observed behavior about some exogenous characteristics of agents. Reputation effects on decisions arise when an agent adjusts his or her behavior to influence data others use in learning about him.
I follow Kreps and Wilson (1982a) and
Reputation is important when there is a diverse pool of relevant exogenous characteristics in an observationally equivalent group of agents because this implies that there is a substantial amount to learn about an agent. My model analyzes the joint influence of adverse selection and moral hazard on the ability of reputation to eliminate the conflict of interest between borrowers and lenders about the choice of risk in investment decisions. If, initially, there is widespread adverse selection (a large proportion of borrowers with undesirable characteristics), reputation effects will be too weak to eliminate the conflict of interest for borrowers with short track records. Adverse selection becomes less severe as time produces a longer track record, and a good reputation can eventually become strong enough to eliminate the conflict of interest for borrowers with a long record of repayment without a default. Alternatively, if there is not substantial initial adverse selection, reputation can begin to work immediately. Two examples in Section VI illustrate these points explicitly.
A reputation that takes time to begin to work implies that new borrowers (with short track records) will face more severe incentive problems and would be the ones most likely to utilize costly technologies for dealing with such problems, such as restrictive covenants in bond indentures (see Smith and Warner 1979) and additional monitoring by a financial intermediary (see Diamond 1984 Diamond , 1988 . The model focuses on the study of debt markets but has implications about the dynamics of reputation formation in general.1 The general characteristics of markets in which reputation takes time to begin to work are discussed in the conclusion.
An implication of most existing models of reputation, especially Holmstrom (1982) , is that the effect of reputation is strongest at the start of an agent's "career" and does not take time to begin to work. This occurs because the amount of information an action can reveal about one's type is highest in the beginning when there are few previous data about actions (and because the horizon can only get shorter).2 This implies that there would be a strong effort put into ' For some early studies of reputation in debt markets, see Spatt (1983) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) .
2 There has been some previous analysis of reputation building. In the two-sided uncertainty version of Kreps and Wilson (1 982a), "weak" types follow a mixed strategy between playing tough or weak, and enough repeated realizations of tough behavior convince others that one is probably not weak, building one's reputation. Milgrom and having a good beginning to one's track record. This previous work focuses on the incentive effects of the prospect of having a reputation in the future rather than the effects of one's current reputation. Other models of reputation, such as Fama (1980) and Klein and Leffler (1981) , are silent on the dynamics of the strength of reputation effects.
My model begins with an observationally equivalent cohort of riskneutral borrowers with no track record. One type of borrower has available two projects (which arrive each period): a safe project with a high expected return and a negative net present value risky project with a low expected return (but a high maximum return). The incentive problem is that the debt contract might provide incentives to choose the risky, less valuable project. There are two other indistinguishable types of borrowers: those who have access only to a risky project and those who have access only to a safe project.
Imperfect information about borrowers leads to different types being lumped together and initially treated identically: all will be charged the same initial interest rate.3 Interest rates charged in the future and the prospects for borrowing in the future will depend on the information that later becomes available; a borrower's repayment record (the "track record") will provide this information. Apart from information that is unrelated to repayment history (such as accounting information), all situations in which there is no default are indistinguishable. The investment project chosen by a borrower is not observed by lenders. The most favorable message a repayment history can provide is a lack of default. Because many borrowers who select risky projects do not default, it takes a long time to indicate that safe projects have been selected. Ex post project returns are borrowers' private information: outsiders cannot observe the ex post profitability because the entrepreneur can appropriate some of the returns to himself. This implies that financial contracts cannot depend directly on this information, ruling out equity contracts. Lenders know the proportion of each borrower type. The interest rate charged in the initial period (for one-period zero-coupon bonds) is set such that, given the proportions, lenders receive a competitive expected return. The higher the proportion of borrowers who choose the risky project, the higher the rate. After one Roberts (1982) also allow a type that cannot play tough, and this can cause reputation building in the initial period of their model. Neither paper focuses on reputation acquisition, and because actions are assumed to be observable, neither is consistent with a given agent choosing the weak action in the beginning and then later switching to the strong action. 3 In the model, ex ante separation by choice of contract before any borrowing takes place is not viable period, some borrowers default and some do not. The class of nondefaulters is now a more select group: the proportion of those with only risky projects has declined. The second-period interest rate charged to this group will be less than the initial rate, and this decline continues over time for the class of nondefaulters. With a long time horizon, these reduced rates for a borrower who does not default imply that the present value of the borrower's rents for any constant investment decision rises over time: the reputation itself becomes a valuable asset, and a single default causes a large decline in its value. This loss of value arises because default leads to a cutoff of credit (or, more generally, to an increase in the interest rate charged).
The value of a good reputation rises over time, as does the cost of a default. Therefore, over time, the relative payoff of the risky project (a very large payoff when it has a favorable outcome) declines relative to a safe but profitable project. If there is sufficient adverse selection, then a typical equilibrium path for a borrower with access to both types of projects is to choose risky projects when "young" and, if able to survive long enough without a default, to switch to safe projects from that point forward. In this formulation, reputation is important because it becomes a valuable asset worth protecting.4
The balance of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the setup of the model. Section III outlines the borrowing and lending arrangements each period and studies the one-period horizon. Sections IV and V provide analysis of the details of the model's equilibrium. Section IV derives optimal project choice for given interest rates and interest rates for given project choice. Section V analyzes the endgame, the periods near the horizon. Section VI presents a special case of the model to make the main points about what determines the evolution of reputation effects over time. Section VII generalizes the characterization to the general model. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. The Basic Model: Technology, Endowments, and Preferences
All borrowers and lenders are risk neutral. Lenders receive an endowment of inputs each period, and each has access to a constant returns to scale technology for storing endowment within a period, converting it to a consumption good at the end of a period. This ' This feature of the collateral-like incentive value of an asset that depreciates in case of default is also present in Merton (1978) , where it arises in the case of a bank that prepays for many years of deposit insurance, and failure implies that it can issue insured deposits for only a few of those years. The difference is that it arises endogenously in this formulation and is not necessarily present in the initial time periods.
technology returns r units of output at the end of a period per unit of input at the beginning of the period. Inputs must be stored (or used as an input in a project described below) within a period before it is possible to consume them. In an attempt to model lenders as an anonymous capital market rather than a financial institution, I assume that a given lender exists for only one period, implying that borrowers face a new set of lenders each period. The implication of this assumption is that reputation in the form of a borrower's credit history is the only intertemporal linkage. There is an infinite number of potential lenders each period. There is no commitment technology available to lenders. Lenders cannot commit themselves to take actions in the future (or at the end of a given period) that are not then in their ex post interest, even if this would be beneficial ex ante. Borrowers receive no endowment but have access to indivisible investment projects each period (and do not have storage technology). They are indistinguishable from lenders (but contracts for borrowers turn out to be unattractive to lenders, and vice versa, so this is an unnecessary assumption). There are three sorts of projects, and the set of projects available to each borrower is his private information. Borrowers can commit to some degree by writing contracts each period that depend on publicly observed variables.
There are three types of borrowers: Type G borrowers have one safe project each period. They can invest one (dollar) and receive G > r at the end of the period. Type B borrowers have one risky, lowexpected-return project each period. They can invest one, and with probability HB < 1, the project returns B (where HBB < rand B > G); with probability 1 -[IB, it returns zero. Type BG borrowers have their choice each period between either one of two projects, but not both. One project is identical to that of type G's and the other is similar to that of type B's, except the probability of its returning B is H?B5 Let the initial population of borrowers contain a fractionfG of type G's, fB of type B's, and fBG of type BG's. These fractions are public information. The returns on the risky projects are all independently distributed. A borrower's type is private information, and all borrowers initially appear identical. In addition, the realized output of a project is private information observed only by the borrower. This makes it difficult to make a borrower's payments depend on a project's realized return. There is, however, a costly liquidation technology that borrowers can commit to use in financial contracts contingent on any publicly observed action or outcome. This technology allows ' It is simplest to think about the case in which 11 = HB, and the risky project is identical to that of type B borrowers. The extra generality is stated simply because all our results hold for 1I < HB as well. the output of the project to be seized before the borrower can consume it. It is extremely costly to do this: it destroys the output, so the value then observed by the public is always zero if the project is liquidated. This limits the liquidation and bankruptcy process to working as a contract enforcement device that is costly to utilize. This corresponds to the role of liquidation in the world; it is used as a threat rather than a universally used information service. If an alternative assumption were made that costly liquidation made the realized value of project output observable to the public, liquidation would be useful in determining the type of the borrower. In particular, it would then allow those with successful risky projects to be distinguished from those with safe projects. Even without such an informational role, liquidation is useful in providing incentives for repayment. It serves to prevent the borrower from following a policy of "take the money and run."
Lenders in each period observe each borrower's history of defaults. They know the dates on which a borrower has borrowed and on which there was liquidation. This is assumed to be the only information available about the past: the series of past interest rates paid is not observed. An earlier version of this paper (Diamond 1986 ) uses the more general assumption that all past interest rates are observed and obtains identical outcomes to those found under this assumption. 6 Borrowers maximize discounted expected consumption over T periods, where T is finite but very large (we take the limit as T -> o). Assume finite T because infinite T introduces many equilibria that are not limits as T -> o (see Dybvig and Spatt 1980) . Borrowers make decisions to maximize discounted expected consumption, given by ET= 1E(ct) * dt, where ct is the realization of the consumption random variable et in period t, and d is the discount factor that discounts endof-period expected consumption to its beginning-of-period value. Assume d < 1, implying that borrowers discount the future.
To focus on the importance of a long time horizon in providing incentives, assume that with a one-period horizon (with T = 1), type BG borrowers would select risky projects. The restriction on parameter values that yield this result is discussed in Section 1i1A.
The total inputs that can be utilized by all available projects (the sum of all three types) is less than the aggregate endowment of capital goods each period. The storage process is in use at the margin in any equilibrium, and competition among lenders in selecting debt contracts implies that a borrower can borrow by offering lenders a contract that provides an expected return of r per unit loaned. The projects are in economic scarcity, and any rents they generate in equilibrium will go to the agents endowed with the projects.
Consumption of each agent must be nonnegative (ct -0 for all t). This bit of realism is important. If this assumption were dropped, one might never need outside financing; one could simply consume a negative amount in early periods (producing goods) and consume positive amounts later (repaying one's "borrowed utility"). Alternatively, one could always issue riskless debt in that case, by producing enough goods through negative consumption to pay off any claim. In addition, no stronger punishment or nonpecuniary penalty can be imposed that is more severe than zero consumption. This is a form of limited liability, ruling out debtors' prisons, physical punishment, and similar phenomena.
The equilibrium concept used in this repeated game of incomplete information is sequential Nash equilibrium, defined in Kreps and Wilson (1982b) 
III. Borrowing and Lending with Debt Contracts
The contract between borrowers and lenders is assumed to be a debt contract. At the cost of longer arguments, debt can be shown to be the optimal contract given the private information and unobservability of project returns that makes equity contracts (where lenders receive a share of realized returns) infeasible. Work on single-period contract design by Townsend (1979) , Diamond (1984) , and Gale and Hellwig (1985) shows that this unobservability implies that contracts are optimally of the debt form.
There are four stages each period. First borrowers offer contracts to lenders, then lenders decide which loan contracts to accept, then borrowers who get loans choose their projects, then they observe the return on their projects and decide how much to pay to lenders (facing liquidation for some possible payments). In the sequential equilibrium established below, the face value (one plus the interest rate) on debt in a given period, rt, is the same for all types. If r, is such that lenders get an expected return below r, given the proportion of types in a period, the contract is rejected in the second stage. If rt provides an expected return of at least r, it is accepted. A debt contract at date t is parameterized by rt and involves commitment to liquidation for all payments less than rt. It will turn out that all borrowers who can pay rt or more will pay rt, and all others will be liquidated. Although rt is a face value of a loan of one dollar, at times rt will be referred to as the "interest rate," and parameters that result in higher or lower interest rates will be discussed. This will not lead to ambiguity because the interest rate on a loan is rt -1, a one-to-one function of the face value.
A. One-Period Horizon: T = 1 (or the Final Period if T> 1)
This is the case that has been analyzed previously in Fama and Miller (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) . The one-period model here is different because of the imperfect information about borrowers, and it is similar to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) . This is a necessary input to the multiple-period model because at the final period there will remain just one period. Project outcomes are unobservable to lenders and cannot be used to directly specify debt repayments. Use of the liquidation technology can provide incentives for repayment by specifying a face value rT for each loan of one unit, such that there is liquidation if less is repaid and liquidation is avoided if at least rT is paid. Because liquidation implies the destruction of all output from the project, it also implies zero consumption by a borrower. If a project returns more than rT, a borrower can repay rT and consume the remainder of the project's return. No borrower would ever pay less than face value (and consume zero) if he could pay face value (and consume the excess of his project's return over the face value of debt). No borrower would pay more than rT because this reduces the borrower's consumption (com-pared to paying rT) and has no other benefit since liquidation is avoided by paying rT. This implies that borrowers with projects returning rT or more pay rT, and all others are liquidated. In addition, if' loans are made, rT must be less than or equal to G, the maximum amount that type G borrowers can pay. A higher rT would lead to liquidation for all borrowers with projects with an expected return greater than the opportunity cost r, implying that lenders would not lend.
The choice of project by type BG's facing a given face value of debt rT needs to be analyzed to determine the equilibrium value of rT. Facing an exogenous face value rT implies that if BG's choose safe projects, their expected utility at the end of the period is G -rT. If they choose risky projects, the expected utility is H(B -rT).7 The optimal selection is the one with the larger expected utility, implying that safe projects are best if and only if rT ' (G -HB)/(l -H), and risky projects are best if and only if the reverse inequality holds. This means that the level of interest rates can influence the optimal choice. Lower values of rT improve the relative position of safe projects (because interest costs are paid only with probability 1I with a risky project, but with certainty with a safe project). Figure 1 
plots the beginning-of-period values, d(G -rT) and dH(B -rT), as functions of rT.
The equilibrium face value rT is set such that risk-neutral lenders receive an expected return of at least r, the riskless return on storage. The face value that will deliver an expected return of r depends on the investment decision that the type BG's are expected to make because more loans default if they select risky projects. Let rVK denote the face value that makes a lender's expected return equal to r if type G, no loans are made. In any case, if 4> G, no loans are made. Given this policy, all borrowers offer the lowest interest rate that lenders will accept. Lenders' belief about borrower type as a function of the interest rate, rT, offered is that for all feasible rates, the type is not a function of the rate. This is self-fulfilling because given it all borrowers offer the lowest rate that will lead to a loan: rg is the equilibrium rate if it offers lenders an expected return of r.8 The equilibrium rate in the final period is the lowest one that gives lenders an expected return of exactly r.
To focus on the role of a long horizon (as distinct from just imperfect information), we assume that the risky projects are sufficiently close to being profitable (have expected values FB < r, but not close to 8 This belief-that the implication of any rate offered is the pool of all current borrowers-satisfies various refinements of sequential Nash equilibrium (e.g., the ChoKreps [1987] intuitive criterion that disallows inferences from off-equilibrium actions that imply belief that some type took an action dominated by the proposed equilibrium payoff). This is true because all types prefer lower interest rates, and the only types that want to distinguish themselves are the type G's, who never default and therefore face a cost of higher rates that is weakly higher than the cost for other types. There is no consistent interpretation of a deviation from all types offering the same rate, and this is true in any sequential equilibrium. This also implies that the pooling on the lowest rate is the unique equilibrium that satisfies the definition in Grossman and Perry (1986). zero), such that even if financed at the lowest possible rate (the riskless interest rate r), the optimal one-period choice for a type BG is to choose risky projects. That is, we know rT ? r and we assume >G-HB r 1-HII.
Thus for all values offB,fBG, andfG for which the market does not fail, the type BG borrowers will select risky projects and the interest rate rT will prevail if there is a one-period horizon. The market is open at T if and only if rb < G or, equivalentlyfG> [(r/G) -(LffBG + JIBfB)l > 0. One interpretation of this condition is that only a borrower with a track record that implies a strictly positive probability of being of type G will have a chance of borrowing at the final date T. Lemma 1 summarizes the results about a one-period horizon. LEMMA 1. At the final period, T, (a) all borrowers offer the debt contract with the lowest interest rate that provides an expected return of r; (b) all borrowers who can repay their debt do so, and all others default; and (c) only those borrowers with track records that imply a sufficiently high (and strictly positive) probability of being of type G are able to borrow.
B. Lending and Repayment Decisions with Multiple Periods
The three properties of equilibrium at T in lemma 1 turn out to be properties of equilibrium at all previous dates. The stage that is of most interest in this study is the decision of borrowers about the choice of project. To focus on that decision, the policies followed at the other stages are briefly studied first, and analysis of the project selection decision is deferred to Section IV. Let us begin with the final strategic stage in a period: the decision of borrowers on how much to repay. This can be studied without a full analysis of the previous stages by establishing two useful properties of the second stage in which lenders decide whether to grant credit in a period. Given the characterization of the final (repayment) stage and the two properties of the second (loan-granting) stage, Section IIIC shows that at the first stage all borrowers offer the lowest possible interest rate, as in the one-period analysis. Lenders observe the previous default record of each borrower. Borrowers face lenders who live for a single period, but lenders know that borrowers will want to continue borrowing in the future. Both take these anticipated future actions into account. One implication of this forecast of future actions is that lenders will not lend to a borrower unless they think there is some chance that he is of type G. We saw that no one would lend at T unless there was a strictly positive probability that a borrower was of type G. No one known to be of type B would receive a loan because a type B's project has a total expected return below r. No one would lend to a known type BG by a familiar argument using backward induction: no one would lend in the final period (because risky projects with expected return below r would be selected), and successively earlier periods become the "last" borrowing opportunity, implying that no one would ever lend. This establishes the following lemma.
LEMMA 2. If a borrower is revealed at time t to be of either type B or type BG, no one will lend to him thereafter.
This cutoff of credit to those known not to be of type G requires no commitment by lenders; such lending is simply unprofitable.
Lemma 3 states a property of the face value of any loan that lenders would accept. It follows from the requirement that lenders get an expected return of at least r per dollar lent. Proof. See the Appendix. The proof of the optimal repayment policy is almost the same as that in the one-period case. Suppose that credit is cut off on a single default. Then all borrowers who could avoid default and liquidation would do so, and because all situations in which there is not default are indistinguishable, no borrower would pay more than the minimum necessary to avoid default. Given that repayment policy, only those who cannot repay rt C [r, G] default, and such borrowers are not of type G. A default then does indeed cut off credit, by lemma 2, and the beliefs about the implications of a default are self-fulfilling.9' 9 The belief' that those who have def'aulteci are those who were constrained to default and that those who did not are the pool of' all who could avoid default satisfies the refinements to equilibrium mentioned in n. 8. This is because default is feasible f'or all types and has the lowest cost f'or the types who must default, implying that it is not selff'ulfilling to believe that defatilt conveys news that default could have been avoided. There can be no future favorable inference from current default, and there is a current benefit from avoiding liquidation, so all who can do so avoid default. This is the unique self-fulfilling belief' about repayment and default of' a loan actually granted in the past.
An immediate consequence of this lemma is a rule that lenders use in deciding if a loan should be made. This is lemma 5.
LEMMA 5. Any default (payment of less than rt) by a borrower at a date t leads to no lending for all future dates.
Because default will reveal that a borrower is not of type G, it will influence his future treatment by lenders: no more credit will be advanced.'0 This learning from observed behavior is key to the incentive value of reputation. One might actively avoid default (by choosing safe projects) to avoid the premature cutoff of one's credit, even though one will later choose risky projects (e.g., in the final period). This incentive effect is analyzed in Section IV.
C. Rates Offered at the Beginning of Each Period
Borrowers who can repay and avoid liquidation will pay the minimum payment that avoids liquidation: this payment is rt. This first stage is for borrowers to offer the debt contracts, and this is a choice of rt. We saw in Section IIIA that in the final period all borrowers offer the lowest rate that provides lenders with an expected return of r. Borrowers offer the lowest possible rate in all periods. The supporting beliefs and actions of lenders are that they believe that the rate offered at T -1 reveals nothing new about a borrower's type, and they will lend at the lowest rate that gives an expected return of r given the belief that each borrower is a random draw from the pool of all borrowers who have not yet defaulted. Under this belief there is no current benefit from offering a higher than needed rate. The only possible motivation for such a higher current rate is a possible future benefit: for example, a borrower's attempt to signal his type by offering a higher than needed interest rate. If any borrower deviated and offered a rate higher than the minimum, he would be indistinguishable in the future from those who offered the lower rate and would achieve no future benefit." This implies that all borrowers pool and offer the lowest rate that provides lenders with an expected return of 10 It is not essential to our basic approach that credit be cut off. A similar effect occurs in a version of this model in which all projects have positive net present value but safe projects have higher net present value. This implies that the best response to a default is an increase in the interest rate. 1 l One more general implication of lemma 1 is that contract choice cannot separate the various types of borrowers, no matter how the beliefs are specified. Any contract that only a type other than G would offer would lead to no lending now or in the future and zero consumption for the borrower offering the contract. A contract that specifies a payment feasible for type G's (who can pay at most G) would allow the other types to have positive expected consumption, dominating the zero consumption implied by a separating contract that would be offered only by a type other than G. r at T-1. The argument extends recursively to all previous t < T.12 We have established the following lemma.
LEMMA 6. At all dates all borrowers offer the lowest interest rate that provides lenders with an expected return of r.
Within each period we have established some properties of a sequential equilibrium in which the interest rate offered at the beginning correctly takes into account a part of the rule that lenders use to grant loans and the rule that each borrower will use to repay at the end of each period. Given these properties, the project decisions of type BG borrowers can be analyzed. Only given that analysis can the "lowest interest rate that provides lenders with an expected return of r" in lemma 6 be precisely defined. Section IV provides this analysis for given interest rates and an analysis of interest rates for given project decisions.
IV. Project Choice and Interest Rates

A. Project Decisions for Given Interest Rates
At the final period, type BG borrowers will select risky projects. The T -1 present value of continuing to borrow until period T (by not defaulting at T -1 because a default cuts off credit by lemma 5) is thus the value of choosing a risky project. Let Vt be the maximized value as of t of making optimal project decisions from t to T. At T this is given by VT = dH(B -rT).
Define Vb and Vf to be the value as of t of choosing, respectively, a risky and a safe project at t and making optimal decisions thereafter. The belief that the rate offered reveals nothing new about type satisfies the refinements mentioned in n. 8, and pooling of rates at this rate is the only outcome that fulfills the equilibrium defined in Grossman and Perry (1986). The reason is the same as at the final period T: offering rates above the minimum needed has no differentially lower cost for type G (the only type that would want to differentiate itself), and the new wrinkle is that in later periods those who offer rates deviating from the proposed equilibrium rates are treated identically to those who offer the proposed equilibrium rates. Therefore, there is no consistent interpretation of a deviation from the proposed rates. Reducing the interest rate charged to a borrower at any date makes safe projects become relatively more attractive on that date. Reduced interest rates at date t also increase Vtb and Vf, implying that Vt = max{Vtb, Vf} is increased. This makes safe projects more attractive at t -1. By a similar argument, V, 1 is increasing in Vt, implying that a reduction in rt increases Vt-i, which makes safe projects relatively more attractive on date t -2 and, by recursion, on all dates before t.
Clearly
The most favorable situation for the selection of safe projects is one in which "interest rates" are at their minimum possible value, rt = r. This provides a necessary condition for reputation effects to have value and induce type BG's to select safe projects on some date. It will later be shown to be a sufficient condition when T -> oo. This is a necessary condition for there to exist a date t on which Vf 2 Vb. 
Q.E.D. Lemma 8 makes sense because the loss of reputation from a default at worst results in a cutoff of credit, and if the rents on the safe project are low enough that they are exceeded by those of choosing risky projects at the low rate r (and conditions [2]-[4] fail), loss of reputation is not a potent enough weapon to induce cooperative behavior. This condition is also sufficient if T -o, but proof of this is deferred to Section V.
Lemma 9 provides a sufficient condition for the selection of safe projects at a date if the horizon is long. It states that if future interest rates are below a given level at all dates in the future, then safe projects are currently optimal. This level of future interest rates will specify feasible future rates (i.e., rates greater than the riskless rate) only if conditions in lemma 8 hold.
LEMMA 9. If, for all t E [I, T], rt < dG + (1 -d)(G -HB)I(1 -H), then there exists T < oc such that safe projects are the optimal choice at date t: T such that ri -Vi+ I ? (G -HB)/(1 -H). This bound on future interest rates specifies feasible rates-that is, dG + (1 -d)(G -HB )/(1 -H) > r-if and only if the necessary conditions (in lemma 8) for reputation to have value are true.
Proof. See the Appendix. The conditions for safe projects to be selected at some date in lemmas 8 and 9 are stated in terms of interest rates, which are endogenous. The next subsection describes equilibrium interest rates for given project decisions. Section V uses these results to provide general necessary and sufficient conditions for reputation effects to be strong enough on some date to imply the selection of safe projects on some date. The remainder of the characterization in the general case is deferred to Section VII.
B. Interest Rates for Given Project Decisions
For any equilibrium there is a range that bounds the equilibrium interest rate (face value), rt. The lowest value that it can attain is the value that provides a normal expected return, r, to lenders under the assumption that type BG borrowers choose safe projects. As in our discussion in Section IIIA, we call this rate 4f. The Because rt --r as t --oo, if the horizon T --oc, there will be an arbitrarily large number of periods in which, for all E > 0, rt < r + e. Lemma 9 then implies that the necessary conditions for the selection of safe projects on some t (e.g., condition [2]) are necessary and sufficient for the selection of safe projects at some date and for the endgame to have bounded length as T --oc. This is lemma 10.
LEMMA 10. If fBG = 0, then the necessary conditions stated in lemma 8 for selection of safe projects on some t as T -s oo are necessary and sufficient for a bounded endgame as T -> oo.
This result can be directly extended to fBG > 0, but not too large. On any date, rt ? rbt. Suppose thatfBG is low enough so that iffBt = 0, then r$t< dG + (1 -d) 
(G -HB)/(1 -H). As t -oo,fBt -0, implying that there is a t < oo such that rb < dG + (1 -d)(G -HB)/(1 -H). If the horizon T --oo, then an immediate application of lemma 9 implies that the conditions in lemma 8 are necessary and sufficient for a bounded length endgame iffBG is not too large.
If fBG is large, implying that rb might exceed dG + (1 -d)(G -HB)/(1 -H) even with a low fBt, the direct application of lemma 9 to an upper bound on future interest rates cannot be made. The next subsection analyzes the case of largefBG.
B. A Bounded Endgame as T -o when fBG > 0
To establish that (2) and r, ' G are necessary and sufficient for a bounded length endgame (i.e., v --> oo as T --oc), we proceed in two steps. First, an interest rate path rt, that provides lenders with an expected return of r each period and yields a bounded length endgame is established. Then it is shown that borrowers will offer interest rates that result in a bounded length endgame. When fBG > 0, the possible increase in interest rates on a date v when a switch is made to risky projects implies that there may need to be some periods in which some type BG's select safe projects and others select risky projects. The interest rate rb that prevails if all BG's select risky projects could be too high iffBc,, the fraction of the original pool of borrowers who are of type BG and who have not defaulted by date 7, is too high. For example, rb could exceed G (and be inconsistent with an open market), or it could be less than G but be high enough to imply such a low VT that it would be inconsistent with selection of safe projects at v -1. In either case a period of time is needed in which some type BG's select safe projects and others select risky projects. This would require that they be indifferent between the two projects on those dates.
IffBG is large, rb might exceed the level specified in lemma 9, even if fBt = 0. The following lemmas show that a bounded period of mixed strategy project selection will allow fBGt to be reduced sufficiently to guarantee that after the mixed strategy period, r$b c dG + (1 -d)(G -HB)/(1 -H) , allowing application of lemma 9 and the result that the period after the mixed strategy period is bounded. In addition we show that directly before the mixed strategy period, type BG's select safe projects in pure strategy.
A period of mixed strategy indifference obviously requires that on all dates of it, including the final date of indifference, BG's be willing to select safe projects. Lemma 11 gives a bound on V,+I that is required for indifference at t. At some period t = t' after an indifference period, risky projects will be selected in pure strategy (e.g., at t = T), and the interest rates r$,' will prevail. At any date t', we know that r, < rb, for t > t'. Lemmas 12 and 13 show that a bounded period of mixed strategy before t' can reducefBGt' sufficiently to allow rt, to be less than or equal to the level (given in lemma 9) that implies that safe projects will be selected at t'. The result, proposition 1, is that if the market does not fail, then the necessary conditions (in lemma 8) for reputation to have value are necessary and sufficient for a bounded length endgame. 1 -d)(G -HB)/(1 -H) , and there exists a bounded length period thereafter that begins with Vt E [L, H); this supports the mixed strategy period. This implies that there exists an interest rate path that leads to a bounded endgame. The result of lemma 6, that borrowers offer the lowest feasible rates each period, implies the stronger result that the interest rates actually offered by borrowers imply a bounded length endgame. This is because at any date before the shortest feasible endgame, it is feasible for all borrowers to offer the interest rate 4f, and by lemma 6, this is the rate that is offered.
During the endgame, rates above 4f will be offered, but these are the lowest feasible rates on those dates.
Overall, we have established the following proposition. PROPOSITION 1. If the loan market is active, then the endgame is of bounded length as T -* oo if and only if (2) is true.
With this result that the endgame comprises a bounded number of periods near T, the focus on the few periods near the end is complete.
VI. The Dynamics of Reputation with a Long Horizon
Far enough from the horizon, T, safe projects will be selected if and only if (2) holds. If (2) is false, there is never an incentive effect of reputation. We now focus on the case in which (2) which is a strictly decreasing function of t'. On some date t' < T, safe projects will be selected because the sum will exceed the critical value r -[(G -HIB)/(1 -H)] and will exceed this value for all t < t'. This implies that on all dates t < t' safe projects will be selected because at any date t' the value of continuing to borrow is at least the value of borrowing and choosing the risky project each period. Figure 4 shows r -Vt+ 1, when interest rates are constant at the riskless rate, r.
The implication of this special case is that if there is no significant adverse selection, so interest rates do not change as a function of one's reputation, then reputation works immediately if it ever works: safe projects are selected at t = 1 unless risky projects are selected for all t. This is consistent with the basic intuition from previous models of reputations. However, for borrowers with short track records (small t), the higher rates, rt > r, have two effects because the decision between safe and risky projects depends only on rt -V,+ ,. Higher rates make safe projects relatively less attractive for given Vte + I. and higher current rates reduce Vi', making safe projects less attractive for t < t'. This implies that if fB is high enough (initial interest rates are high enough), then the finite number of type BG's will select risky projects at some early dates, even though those who do not default will later select safe projects. In principle they might switch back and forth between the two projects. Proposition 2 provides a characterization of the scope for project switching assuming only that rt falls over time. Under the assumption that fBG = 0, (5) shows that r, does fall over time. In Section VII, proposition 2 will be shown to apply withfBG > 0 if the remaining time before the horizon is sufficiently long. PROPOSITION 2. If rt falls over time and a type BG borrower optimally selects safe projects at t + and selects risky projects at some t' < t+, then risky projects are optimal for all t < t'. This implies that if safe projects are best on two dates t, and t + (t, < t +), then the optimal project selection is safe projects for all t E [t1, t+].
Proof. Let date i ? t' be tJe largest date that is less than t + on which Proposition 2 makes no use of the length of the time horizon. There are only two reasons for choosing risky projects: a short horizon or high current interest rates. Because interest rates fall over time conditional on not defaulting, the only reason for switching to risky projects once rates are low enough to justify safe projects is a short horizon. If there is a date on which safe projects are selected, then on such a date, or any earlier date, a short horizon is not the problem. If risky projects are selected on such an earlier date, the problem is high interest rates. If one goes back further in time, rates are higher, so risky projects are again best. Figure 5 shows the time path of rt -Vt + 1, computed using the interest rates in figure 3 (rates that decline over time). Proposition 2 implies that if rates decline with longer periods of lack of default, then r, -V, plotted as a function of t can cross the threshold for choice of safe projects, (G -HR )/(1 -HI), at most twice. If the rates in the early periods are sufficiently above r because of a large fraction of type B's (but are less than G), then the optimal choice on those dates will be risky projects, again by the reasoning of lemma 7. If the horizon is long, the reason is simpler. If the horizon is long enough, Vt+ I ' Vt because rates fall while the horizon is not significantly reduced (the proof is left to the reader).
The result of this example is that when there is significant adverse selection (a heterogeneous pool of borrower qualities) in the initial pool of borrowers with no track record, then reputation initially will not deal with moral hazard problems, but instead a period of "reputation acquisition" will be required. If the adverse selection is severe enough, so there are high interest rates (from [5]) in early periods for those with short track records and resulting low V, for low t, reputation will not work in early periods, and risky projects will be selected for t = 1, . . . , t until rates fall enough for rt -Vt+I to be less than (G -IB)/(1 -II). Borrowers without track records will select risky projects. Only some of those who select risky projects will default, and the others will get a good reputation. This will eventually lead to such a good credit rating and such low interest rates that type BG borrowers who have not defaulted will want to avoid loss of this valuable credit rating and will switch to safe projects for an unbounded number of periods until the endgame. That is, there will be a period of reputation acquisition, but eventually reputation will work to provide incentives. The next section shows that this result applies in general, withfBG > 0, and provides a full characterization of equilibrium. Under the assumption fBG = 0, characterization of equilibrium for any horizon length was a matter of computing the functions Vb and Vf using the interest rates in (5). With fBG > 0, we need to determine whether the appropriate rate each period is rf or r$t. The result of proposition 1, that all borrowers offer the lowest feasible interest rate, suggests the following characterization, which is established below. First, try a conjecture in which, from t = 1 until the endgame, type BG's choose safe projects (and face interest rates rt = ?f every period until the endgame). If this leads to interest rates that imply the conjectured behavior by type BG's, it is the equilibrium rate path, by proposition 1. On the other hand, if the interest rate series conditioned on the assumption that type BG's select safe projects leads type BG's to find risky projects more profitable (because there are many type B's and thus high rates), then the equilibrium at t = 1 involves their selecting risky projects (and paying higher rates that reflect this). If r, < G and (2) 4f gets sufficiently high that risky projects are best at some date t ', then on that date rt' = rt. In addition, at any date t < t', rt ' rS,+1, so safe projects will not be selected at t < t'. This implies that interest rates fall over time until the endgame and that the result of proposition 2 applies: if T -o and one considers dates away from the bounded endgame, then if safe projects are selected at t* and risky projects at t' < t*, then risky projects are selected for all t ' t'.
VII. Equilibrium Path of Project
To actually compute the values Vt, values for ?f and rtb are needed, and these depend on decisions by type BG's at earlier periods. Because proposition 2 applies, the only information needed to calculate these interest rates is the single date I near t = 1, where BG's switch from risky to safe projects. Define the face value Rf[t] to be the one that gives lenders an expected return of r at date t if BG's choose safe projects at t, and the projects selected for dates less than t are risky projects from dates I to t -1 and safe projects for t E [4, t -1] (if t < t -1, obviously there are no past dates on which safe projects were selected). The term R$b[t] is the face value that provides an expected return of r if risky projects are selected at t, and the projects selected at dates less than t are as described in the previous sentence. These rates are easily computed using the definitions of rt and 4f because In summary, if the maximal value of future rents is too small, so (2) is false, there will be no reputation effect. If there are sufficient rents so that (2) is true and is far enough from being an equality, then an active loan market implies immediate reputation. If the rents on safe projects are positive but not exceedingly large (and [2] is not too far from an equality), then there will be reputation acquisition in early periods with risky projects dominating if there is sufficient adverse selection: if fB and rB imply that the face value RfT1] is significantly above r for small t.
VIII. Conclusion
The analysis of incentive problems in debt markets shows that it is likely that these problems will be most severe in early periods when new firms have short track records. If there is sufficiently widespread adverse selection, the initial pool of borrowers will be of low average quality and the interest rates for borrowers with short track records will be high. As a result, the present value of rents in the future from establishing a good reputation will start out very low. Rents can be sufficiently low that those with a choice of projects choose the shortrun optimum, the risky low-value project. A fraction of those who select the risky project achieve success and are able to continually repay their loans, achieving a good reputation. As a borrower achieves a good reputation, the interest rate falls, and the present value of rents in the future from a good reputation rises. Eventually these rents become high enough for the borrower to switch to the long-run optimum, the safe high-value project, for an arbitrarily large number of periods until the endgame. Only if there is little adverse selection will reputation instead work to immediately provide incentives to new borrowers. The model specifies the reputation in terms of the credit rating, which is public information. Observable implications of the model then have empirical content.
A number of the model's conclusions are quite general and apply to the general study of reputation in markets. The key assumptions that differ from the reputation model in Kreps and Wilson (1982a) are that in my model, actions are not observed and there is a nontrivial fraction of all agent types. If actions (project choices) are directly observable, then unless there are incentives in the first period to take an action that is beneficial to one's reputation, there is never any incentive to take that action. In terms of my model, once observed selecting a risky project, a borrower can never credibly claim to be of type G. In terms of the chain store in Kreps and Wilson (1982a) , once it gives in to an entrant, it can never credibly claim to be "tough." The existence of nontrivial fractions of all types, that is, significant adverse selection, is important because otherwise the incentive effect of a reputation would be near its maximal value in the initial period. In my model, borrowing would begin at essentially the riskless rate of interest. In a more general setting, for example a market for goods or services of unobservable quality, if there is significant adverse selection, the market will have low expectations of initial quality, and the market will not pay very high prices for the output of agents without a long record. This implies that agents with short track records will have a low initial present value of rents in the future, and those with a choice will supply low quality. Only over time, with an acquired good record, will there be a large present value of rents in the future from maintaining a good reputation by providing high quality. In addition, although I have not modeled entry, low initial present value of rents is an appealing notion in a free-entry setting.
The model has direct applications to examinations of differential new project acceptance decisions: firms with certain reputations will turn down a given profitable project that others would accept. This can be interpreted as a well-defined cost of capital that is firm specific rather than project specific because of the private information about project decisions. In addition, the model can be used to explain, on the basis of public information, some determinants of which firms choose to borrow through financial intermediaries and use their delegated monitoring services (see Diamond 1988) . If the intermediary (at a cost) can help control project decisions, then the model suggests that firms with short histories will do their reputation acquisition by borrowing from intermediaries. Firms with a long-standing high credit rating will borrow directly in the open market. These are just a few examples of what I hope will be a large harvest of extensions with strong empirical implications. 
